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THE CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT: JURY TRIALS
IN MODERN COMPLEX
LITIGATION*
JAMES S. CAMPBELL**
In the 1970s a number of major U.S. corporations found themselves
embroiled in private civil litigation so complex and protracted that juries
seemed unable to understand the issues and decide them accurately.
This was the experience of the IBM Corporation in several cases, most
notably in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Ma-
chines Corp. (the Memorex case).'
Memorex, a manufacturer of IBM-compatible computer equipment,
had brought an antitrust action challenging IBM's development, pricing,
and marketing of modem electronic data processing systems and certain
peripheral devices included within those systems. Memorex complained
that its ability to compete with IBM was damaged by several of IBM's
business practices, among them: (i) changing interfaces between its prod-
ucts without adequate technological justification, (ii) lowering prices be-
low legitimate competitive levels, and (lii) prematurely announcing new
products. These claims raised many extraordinarily difficult issues of
computer technology, corporate finance, and antitrust economics, all of
which the jury was expected to resolve:
- Was IBM's decision to make certain modifications in a particular
disk drive control unit technologically justified, or were there technologi-
cally superior alternative modifications that could have been made with-
out damaging Memorex's ability to sell a competing product?
Were IBM's prices under its fixed term rental plan justified by
* The lecture upon which this article is based was delivered on September 15, 1987, at a
Washington University School of Law conference on "Original Intent and the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments." This conference was the seventh in a series of eight conferences, sponsored by the
Center for Judicial Studies, exploring the original intent and current interpretation of key provisions
in the Bill of Rights. The article is printed here with the permission of the Center for Judicial
Studies, Washington, D.C.
** Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C. and London.
1. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423
(N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd sub nor. Memorex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 636 F.2d
1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
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financially sound projections of revenues and costs for particular com-
puter products at particular prices and by appropriate allocations of
overhead costs to the products in question?
- Was it appropriate, given the economic determinants of a market,
such as demand and supply substitutability and barriers to entry, to treat
IBM-compatible disk drives'as a separate market, considering the func-
tions performed by the drives, the alternatives actually or potentially
available for performing those functions, and the price/performance
characteristics of those alternatives?
To help the jury resolve such issues, the parties staged a ninety-six day
trial. There were eighty-three witnesses, including seventeen experts.
There were 19,000 pages of transcript and 2,300 trial exhibits. The judge
required over eighty pages to instruct the jury on the law. The jury then
deliberated for nineteen days-and failed to reach a decision.
The judge declared a mistrial and directed a verdict for IBM. Based
on his familiarity with the case and his observations during the trial, the
judge stated that if a retrial were necessary, he would strike the plaintiff's
jury demand: "the magnitude and complexity of the present lawsuit
render it, as a whole, beyond the ability and competency of any jury to
understand and decide rationally."2
Even before the Memorex trial, some of us involved in the IBM cases
had begun to ask ourselves whether the plaintiff in such complex and
protracted cases was really entitled to insist upon a jury trial. To be sure,
the seventh amendment requires that "[i]n Suits at common law ... the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved," and antitrust and securities
damage actions had always been considered suits at common law within
the meaning of the amendment. But in view of the many advantages of
trying such cases to the court rather than to a jury, we thought that
perhaps the whole subject might be reopened.
The spark that first touched off what became an explosion of profes-
sional, judicial and scholarly interest in jury trials of complex cases was a
1976 ruling by a district judge in the state of Washington. He struck a
jury demand in a complex securities case,3 relying on an enigmatic foot-
note in a 1970 Supreme Court decision, Ross v. Bernhard.' There the
Court had indicated that whether a claim was to be treated as a suit at
2. 458 F. Supp. at 448.
3. In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash., 1976).
4. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
[Vol. 66:63
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss1/6
JURY TRIALS & COMPLEX LITIGATION
common law for seventh amendment purposes was to be determined by
three considerations. First, whether it would have been regarded as legal
or equitable before the merger of law and equity. Second, what kind of
remedy was being sought. Third-and here was the new ray of hope-by
considering "the practical abilities and limitations of juries."'
It could not be claimed that Ross made any radical break with the
traditional historical test for determining the scope of the jury trial right
preserved by the seventh amendment. This test looks to the English
common law at the time the seventh amendment was adopted and in-
quires whether the case at bar is "more similar to cases that were tried in
courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty."6 In-
deed, the historical approach to applying the seventh amendment is
nearly as old as the amendment itself, having been unchallenged since
Judge Story wrote in 1812 that the common law to which the amend-
ment refers is "the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all
our jurisprudence."' Accordingly, the potentially promising line of in-
quiry suggested by the Ross footnote was whether in 1791 an English
Chancellor would have considered the "practical abilities and limitations
of juries" and taken into equity a case that he regarded as too complex
for jury resolution.
IBM commissioned the Right Honorable Lord Devlin, a Lord of Ap-
peal in England and a leading authority on the role of the jury in English
law, to make this inquiry. The results of his prodigious research are re-
corded in the January 1980 Columbia Law Review.' Devlin found that in
England in the 18th century the Lord Chancellor, as the voice of equity
and supreme head of the law, took litigation into the jurisdiction of his
own Court of Chancery, even though it might already be pending in the
law courts, whenever, as the leading treatise put it in 1780, the proce-
dures of the law courts were inadequate or the law courts themselves
were being made instruments of injustice. Carefully examining the wide
variety of instances in which the Chancellor exercised the authority,
Devlin argued that "law" and "equity" were not precisely defined, mutu-
ally exclusive categories to which lawsuits were assigned by the accidents
of history.
5. Id. at 538 n.10.
6. Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1835 (1987).
7. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (Story, J.).
8. Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980).
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Instead, Devlin found the Chancellor had always to decide, if asked by
one of the parties in a particular case, whether the action could be justly
decided by the procedures of the common law courts-namely, by proce-
dures that sharply restricted joinder of parties and claims; that did not
provide discovery; that refused to take testimony from the parties them-
selves; and that used juries to decide disputed questions of fact. Devlin
concluded:
[T]he bounds of a common law action were not more precise than the
bounds of an equitable suit. The two were separated, not by a line, but by a
borderland under the dominion of the Chancellor. It is the spirit in which
he exercised his dominion that is important. I am sure that the practical
abilities and limitations of juries would have been a factor very much in the
mind of a Chancellor in 1791. Further, if in any particular case he had
thought the 'practical abilities' not up to the complexities of the case, he
would have had the power to stop the suit at common law.9
Devlin's conclusions, if accepted, raised a second question that needed
attention: even if the English had a rather energetic view of the powers
of a court of equity, might not the framers of the seventh amendment
have wanted to protect the sacred right of jury trial against such equita-
ble encroachments? This inquiry fell to some of the American lawyers
on the IBM team, and the results of our somewhat less prodigious re-
search are recorded (and disputed) in the April, 1980 University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review. 10 Our conclusion was that although the seventh
amendment was an attempt to meet American concerns to use juries in
some civil cases, the amendment did not abandon, but instead carefully
maintained, the traditional English understanding as to the location and
nature of the borderland between law and equity.
While most of our energies were devoted to the proper interpretation
of the seventh amendment, we naturally did not overlook the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Modem Supreme Court decisions have
established that the primary value promoted by due process in fact-find-
ing procedures is "to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions."'11 We
argued that trying an extraordinarily complex and protracted case to a
jury unacceptably increased the risk of an erroneous decision as com-
9. Devlin, supra note 8, at 107.
10. Campbell & LePoidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128
U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980). See Arnold, A Historical Inquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury in
Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980); Arnold, A Modest Replication To A
Lengthy Discourse, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 986 (1980).
11. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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pared with the readily available alternative of a bench trial. We never
regarded the due process clause as our main avenue of attack, in part
because we were unsure whether the courts would accept our due process
argument if it flew in the face of a clear command from the seventh
amendment.
Now, how did we fare in the courts with our effort to remove from
juries cases that we believed were wholly unsuited for that mode of reso-
lution? Several district courts struck jury demands in complex cases, and
several others did not. At the court of appeals level, with IBM either as a
party or an amicus, we had one loss,' 2 one win, 3 and two decisions in
which the court didn't reach our issue.'
4
In our winning case, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co.,15 our victory was less than complete because the court relied solely
on our due process argument in holding that trial by jury may be refused
in a case of such complexity that the jury cannot likely achieve a reason-
able understanding of the relevant evidence and applicable legal rules.
The court carefully examined our seventh amendment analysis and
found it wanting. The Court said that we had departed from the tradi-
tional historical test, in that we were attempting to determine the legal or
equitable nature of a modern antitrust action by inquiring into what
would have been "the likely reaction of the English chancellor to a hypo-
thetical complex suit filed at law in 1791," rather than limiting ourselves
to "comparing it with suits actually tried in courts of common law or
equity."' 6 We could not, the court said, clearly place a complex antitrust
case within one of "the categories of suits specifically recognized as
within" the jurisdiction of equity.' 7
Not long after Zenith was decided in 1980, IBM had either won or
settled on satisfactory terms all the private damage actions that had been
brought against it in the wake of the government's monopolization
case.' 8 As a result, we no longer had a litigating interest in the issue we
12. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 929
(1980).
13. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
14. Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1980); Memorex Corp. v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
15. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d. Cir. 1980).
16. Id. at 1083.
17. Id.
18. The government's monopolization complaint, initially brought on January 17, 1969, was
dismissed by the government itself on January 8, 1982, the government having come to the conclu-
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had worked so hard to reopen, and as it turned out, little further progress
was made in the courts either in addressing the seventh amendment argu-
ment we had developed or in resolving the direct conflict between the
Third and the Ninth Circuits on the ultimate question of whether judges
have the power to refuse jury trials in extraordinarily complex cases.
Several of us continued to have a considerable intellectual interest in
our subject, however, and IBM was generous enough to continue funding
the Devlin project even after it was no longer a matter of practical impor-
tance to the company. The results of our further inquiries are displayed
in Devlin's second major article on jury trials in complex cases, this one
appearing in the June 1983 Michigan Law Review.19 The article is an
extended dialogue with Chief Judge Seitz's opinion in Zenith. In my
view, Devlin successfully establishes at least three critical points against
the Zenith court's rejection of our seventh amendment argument.
There is, Devlin urges, no way to avoid asking what an English Chan-
cellor would have done with a "hypothetical complex suit filed at law in
1791," because for the amendment to preserve trial by jury as it existed
in 1791, it must necessarily preserve it subject to the intervention of eq-
uity as it existed in 1791. Moreover, it misreads English legal history to
see equitable intervention as confined to certain sharply defined catego-
ries of cases. Equity, says Devlin, was above all a set of principles, one of
which was that a suit at common law would not be permitted to proceed
at law if the procedures of the law courts were inadequate to its just
resolution. Finally, if we must have a specific example of equity interven-
ing on the ground of complexity, we have that in several cases, but above
all in O'Connor ,. Spaight.20 This was a common law action of ejectment
for nonpayment of rent that the Chancellor took into equity because the
accounting required to determine the amount of rent due (if any) was
more complex that could be readily handled by the procedures for taking
an account at common law.
Looking back on the jury trial debate of the late 1970s and early 19 80s,
I find that two basic conclusions stand out in my mind.
First, I believe that we cannot rely on the due process clause to solve
the practical problems created by our current interpretation of the sev-
sion that its case was "without merit." See In re United States v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 64,899 (2d. Cir. 1982).
19. Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on the Zenith
Case, 81 MICH. L. Rv. 1571 (1983).
20. 1 Sch. & Lef. 305 (Ire. Ch. 1804).
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enth amendment. If judges fear that a jury trial will not accurately and
efficiently resolve a complex, protracted case, they will naturally seek to
satisfy due process by "improving" the jury's performance. Juries will be
instructed and re-instructed on the law before and during the trial; they
will be allowed to take notes and ask questions; and they will be given
background lectures on economics, electronics, accounting and any other
disciplines necessary to understand the case. The result, as I have argued
elsewhere, will be to turn the jury into something it was never meant to
be, abandoning its virtues of common sense decision-making based on
community values, but without thereby enabling it to handle extraordi-
narily complex commercial cases nearly as well as judges can.21
My second conclusion is that what is now called the "traditional his-
torical test" is in fact profoundly unhistorical. It over-simplifies history
and thus falsifies it. The traditional historical test fails to capture the
richness of the historical reality, for it maintains a narrow focus on two
issues only: the resemblance of the plaintiff's claim to traditional actions
at law or suits in equity, and the typically legal or equitable nature of the
relief sought. In fact, as the recent case Tull v. United States22 makes
clear, the historical test boils down to the nature of the relief alone: in-
junction equals equity, damages (especially punitive damages) equals
law.
Devlin's broader historical perspective is far more illuminating: re-
gardless of the nature of the action or the relief sought, one did not get a
jury in 1791 if the Chancellor believed that the case could not be reliably
and efficiently resolved by the procedures of the common law courts, in-
cluding the procedure of jury fact-finding. There is nothing magical
about the relief sought, for the Chancellor awarded money damages in
the form of compensation or an account,23 and he did not refuse to en-
force all penalties.24 As Devlin has shown, if there was an equity in the
case requiring the Chancellor to intervene, he would not have been pre-
vented from doing so by his supposed inability to order forms of relief
customarily available in the courts of common law.
I am confirmed in my opinion that the traditional historical test is
unhistorical by the most interesting piece of writing on the subject that I
have seen since Devlin put down his pen. A student at the Chicago Law
21. Campbell, A Historical Basis for Banning Juries, NAT'L L.J. Feb 11, 1980, at 17.
22. Tull v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 1831 (1987).
23. Devlin, supra note 19, at 1623-28; see also Devlin supra note 8, at 71-72.
24. Devlin, supra note 8, at 85-95.
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School analyzed all the reported cases in law and equity in England dur-
ing the years 1789, 1790, and 1791, for the purpose of determining the
comparative complexity of suits at law and proceedings at equity.25 Ex-
amining the number of parties, amounts in controversy, and the nature of
the claims, he found that
'[Clomplex' cases, as we understand that term today, simply did not occur
in the common law system known to the framers. Insofar as analogies
based on complexity are appropriate, complex modem litigation bears
much closer resemblance to equitable actions in 1791, heard without a jury,
than to common law actions. 26
The author concludes that the traditional historical test, with its exclu-
sive focus on rights and remedies, wrongly requires jury trial of complex
cases bearing "no resemblance whatsoever to suits heard in the English
common law system."27
The traditional historical test for applying the seventh amendment is a
fiction. The reality is that nothing in the seventh amendment prevents
judges from striking jury demands in complex and protracted civil
litigation.
25. Note, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U.
Cm. L. REv. 581 (1984).
26. Id. at 611.
27. Id. at 613.
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